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It's About Time:
Enforcing Human Rights Through Equitable Tollingf
There's a sunny little country south of Mexico
Where the winds are gentle and the waters flow
But breezes aren't the only things that blow in El Salvador...
Just like Poland is 'protected' by her Russian friends
The junta is 'assisted' by Americans
And if 60 million dollars seems too much to spend in El Salvador.'
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I. A Sunny Little Country South of Mexico
Near the start of Ronald Reagan's first term as president, 1,000
deaths occurred in El Salvador at the hands of military guerrillas.2
When Reagan entered office in January of 1981, the Salvadoran
t This article is dedicated to my father, Bruce Wilson Ballard. I am grateful for
his tremendous assistance, for without him this note would never have been written.
I NOEL PAUL STOOKEY & JIM WALLIS, El Salvador, on No EASY WALK TO
FREEDOM (Neworld Media Music 1986) (as sung by Peter, Paul and Mary).
2 Barbara Slavin & Milt Freudenheim, Salvador Junta Getting Fresh Aid From
Washington, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1981, § 4, at 2.
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President Jose Napoleon Duarte called on him to bring democracy
to El Salvador.3 Viewing the guerillas as Marxist and Duarte as a
moderate and a proponent of democracy, the United States
enthusiastically responded to Duarte's call for support by sending
military advisors, millions of dollars in military aid, and general
economic assistance.4 The monetary aid provided went to support
the Salvadoran junta, a military dictatorship controlled by Duarte.5
Although Democrats in Congress, human rights activists, and
Catholic bishops were critical of the United States' involvement
with Duarte's Salvadoran junta and with what they believed to be
"death squads," Reagan continued to increase aid to El Salvador
throughout the early 1980's.6
Despite reports of massacres at the hands of the U.S.-
supported Salvadoran Government, the Reagan administration
pressed for more aid.7 Support of the junta was a major focus of
American foreign policy during the first few years of the Reagan
Administration. 8 Since that time, the fact that the Salvadoran
government was engaging in brutal human rights violations has
become apparent. Additionally, it is now known that under the
Reagan administration, the United States gave $1 million a day to
"a repressive and often brutal Salvadoran government whose thugs
and death squads killed thousands of people." 9 In total, the United
3 Id.
4 Alan Riding, The Salvador Strategy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1981, at A2; Salvador
Becomes a Smaller Big Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1981, § 4, at 1.
5 Riding, supra note 4 at A2.
6 Juan de Onis, Killings in El Salvador Deplored by the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10,
1981, at A3. For instance, in 1981 President Reagan proposed $26 million in military
aid and $75 million in economic aid for El Salvador. Id.
7 Charles Mohr, Aid to Salvador Expected to Continue, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1982,
at A12. "Despite reports of a large-scale massacre of civilians by Government troops in
El Salvador, President Reagan is still expected to certify that the Salvadoran security
forces are making a 'concerted and significant effort' to respect human rights." Id.
While the State Department opposed human rights abuses, corroboration of these
potential abuses were difficult. Id.
8 See Philip Taubman, House Panel Approves El Salvador Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
9, 1984, at A3 ("President Reagan made El Salvador a focus of American foreign
policy.").
9 Kevin Sullivan & Mary Jordan, In Central America, Reagan Remains a
Polarizing Figure, WASH. POST, June 10, 2004, at A8.
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States offered more than $4 billion in economic and military aid to
the junta during El Salvador's civil war.10
The torture experienced by victims in El Salvador was
extreme. Catholic Church worker Neris Gonzalez was eight
months pregnant when she was abducted." Gonzalez was beaten,
raped multiple times, and placed in a vehicle with dead bodies.'
2
Her unborn son barely survived the encounter and he died two
months after his birth from injuries sustained through the torture of
his mother.'3  It was many years after her son's death that
Gonzales finally found justice in the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals case Arce v. Gonzales.4 Ironically, justice was provided
by the courts of a country that funded her torturers, in a case that
would ultimately make it easier for torture claims like hers to be
brought in the future.
Between 1979 and 1983, El Salvador's junta abducted and
tortured Gonzales and fellow Salvadorans Juan Romagoza Arce
and Carlos Mauricio."5 These three former Salvadoran citizens,
now United States residents, brought a claim under the Alien Tort
Claims Act (ATCA) and Tort Victims Protection Act (TVPA) 6 in
the Southern District of Florida on February 28, 2000 against two
Salvadoran military officials, Jose Guillermo Garcia and Carlos
Eugenio Vides-Casanova. 17 The jury found for the plaintiffs and
ordered a verdict of $54,600,000, holding the defendants liable for
the acts of torture under the vicarious liability doctrine of
command responsibility.' 8  The defendants appealed to the
Eleventh Circuit. 9
On February 28, 2005, the Eleventh Circuit barred the victims'
10 Id.
I I BBC, El Salvador generals guilty of torture, July 23, 2002, http:Hnews.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2147506.stm.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Arce v. Garcia (Arce I), 400 F.3d 1340, 1343 (11 th Cir. 2005), vacated, 434 F.3d
1254, 1256 (2006).
15 Id.
16 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (2006).
17 Arce 1, 400 F.3d at 1343.
18 Arce v. Garcia (Arce II), 434 F.3d 1254, 1259 (11 th Cir. 2006).
19 Id.
20061
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claims under their interpretation of the tolling the statute of
limitations for the ATCA and TVPA.2 ° On August 25, 2005, the
same court, on its own motion, vacated its earlier opinion.2' The
Eleventh Circuit reinstated the district court's damages award of
$54,600,000 on January 4, 2006.2 The court vacated its previous
opinion as a result of its understanding of the equitable tolling of a
statute.23 Equitable tolling determines when a statute will start and
stop running and may extend the amount of time during which a
torture victim can bring a claim.24 The vacated opinion (Arce I)
contains a harsher interpretation of equitable tolling, stating that a
more lenient version of equitable tolling would cause an erosion of
the integrity of the United States courts.25 Yet, in its second
opinion (Arce II), the Eleventh Circuit used the very lenient
standard rejected in the first opinion (Arce I). In addition to the
immediate effect of reinstating the verdict of a rather large damage
award, Arce II will prospectively make it easier to bring similar
claims under the ATCA and TVPA in the future by allowing the
tolling of statutes for many more years than allowed under the
vacated opinion's standard.
This Note will examine equitable tolling under the ATCA and
TVPA and explain the role of Arce v. Garcia in this area of
jurisprudence. This case is important for many reasons. Arce v.
Garcia will make it easier for future torture allegations to be
brought by torture victims. This rare example of a federal appeals
20 Arce 1, 400 F.3d 1351.
21 Arce II, 434 F.3d at 1256.
22 Id.
23 See id.
24 The Eleventh Circuit defines equitable tolling as a "doctrine under which
plaintiffs may sue after the statutory time period has expired if they have been prevented
from doing so due to inequitable circumstances." Ellis v. Gen. Motors Acceptance
Corp., 160 F.3d 703, 706 (11 th Cir. 1998).
25 See Arce I, 400 F.3d at 1351. In its vacated opinion, the Eleventh Circuit stated
that "[a] lenient approach toward equitable tolling would mean that United States courts
would hear claims dating back decades, if not centuries . . .Congress surely did not
intend to permit such 'trial-by-excavation, at least not absent extraordinary
circumstances."' Id. But see Arce Hl, 434 F.3d at 1265 ("[tlhe remedial scheme
conceived by the TVPA and ATCA would fail if courts allowed the clock to run on
potentially meritorious claims while the regime responsible for the heinous acts ...
remains in power.").
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court vacating its own opinion presents an opportunity for the
United States to bring about greater global justice by providing a
forum in which torture victims can seek redress. Part II provides
the appropriate statutory and background law. Part III introduces
the facts of Arce v. Garcia, the procedural history of the case, and
the holdings of the vacated and substituted opinions. Part IV
offers an analysis of case law used under both Arce I and II
regarding equitable tolling and highlights how the substituted
opinion is in accordance with precedent. Part IV also provides an
analysis of the reasoning used in each Eleventh Circuit opinion
and addresses some of the future policy implications of Arce v.
Garcia. Finally, Part V concludes by examining how Arce II
promotes greater justice in light of the United States' involvement
with the Salvadoran military junta.
II. Equitable Tolling under the Alien Tort Claims Act
A. Alien Tort Claims Act
In 1789 the United States Congress passed the Alien Tort
Claims Act (ATCA).26 By enacting the ATCA, Congress intended
to provide a forum for foreign plaintiffs claiming damages for torts
that violated either international law or United States treaties.27
"For nearly 200 years after its passage, the ATCA was rarely
used. ' '2' However, in 1980, the Second Circuit held that the
ATCA "opens federal courts to civil suits by aliens for torts
committed in violation of customary international law, even when
the case involves acts perpetrated in another country by a non-U.S.
citizen. 29
Today the ATCA is used for international tort claims such as
torture, detention, and execution.30 While the ATCA does not
provide a substantive cause of action, it gives a jurisdictional basis
26 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (2006); David E. Chawes, Comment, Time Is Not On Your
Side: Establishing a Consistent Statute of Limitations for the Alien Tort Claims Act, 27
U. SEATrLE L. REV. 191, 193 (2003).
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 See id. at 194 (quoting Richard Herz, Litigating Environmental Abuses Under
the Alien Tort Claims Act: A Practical Assessment, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 545,549(2000)).
30 Id.
2006]
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for international law claims.3' To achieve such a jurisdictional
basis, plaintiffs must allege that they are aliens suing for a tort
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.32
The ATCA does not have an express statute of limitations.33
When a federal statute has no limitations period, the courts must
derive a statute of limitations by looking at similar state law,
federal law, and even the law of the locale in which the tortuous
act occurred if it took place in a foreign country.34 Courts have
used this analysis for the ATCA and in doing so have applied the
ten year statute of limitations for the Tort Victims Protection Act
to the ATCA.3"
B. Tort Victims Protection Act
In the Torture Victims Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA),
Congress established a civil cause of action by providing that:
any individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color
of law, of any foreign nation (1) subjects an individual to torture
shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that individual;
or (2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing shall, in a
civil action, be liable for damages to the individual's legal
representative, or to any person who may be a claimant in an
action for wrongful death .... No action shall be maintained
under this section unless it is commenced within 10 years after
the cause of action arose.36
Although "official torture is prohibited by the law of nations,"37
the continued toleration of or engagement in torture by many of
the world's governments concerned the United States Congress.38
Congress believed that there was an obligation to provide civil
redress for victims of torture, but saw that, in reality, judicial
31 Doe v. Rafael Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1144 (E.D.Cal. 2004).
32 Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1129 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
33 Chawes, supra note 26, at 195.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (2006).
37 Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2nd Cir. 1980).
38 See H.R. REP. No. 102-367 (1991) as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N 84.
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protections were often ineffective in countries where abuses were
most common.3 9  Currently, there is a debate among judges
regarding whether the ATCA provides a private right of action,4°
but even if it does, the ATCA provides a remedy only for aliens
and not for U.S. citizens tortured abroad.4 Congress thus enacted
the TVPA to ensure a remedy for the lack of judicial redress in
other countries.42
C. Equitable Tolling
Statues of limitations protect defendants from claims where an
ordinary person through due diligence should have already filed
the claim. 43 This spares defendants from being forced to litigate
claims when evidence has decreased or become less reliable over
time, memories are years or even decades old, and witnesses are
unavailable at the time of trial.44 This protection lessens the
number of fraudulent 45 and stale claims 46 that go to trial, and aims
to increase the percentage of claims litigated which are valid.47
Assuming a ten-year statute of limitations,48 both the ATCA
and TVPA could allow claims older than ten years to be heard
under the doctrine of equitable tolling. As "equitable tolling is
appropriate when a movant untimely files because of extraordinary
39 Id. at 85.
40 See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 876 (stating that ATCA provides a substantive and
subject matter basis for claims of torture). But see Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,
726 F.2d 774, 799 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Judge Bork, concurring) (questioning the existence
of a private right of action under the ATCA.)
41 S. REP. No. 102-249, at 5 (1991).
42 Id.
43 STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 5.25, at 869-70
(1983).
44 1 CALVIN W. CORMAN, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS § 1.1 (1991).
45 James R. MacAyeal, The Discovery Rule and the Continuing Violation Doctrine
as Exceptions to the Statute of Limitations for Civil Environmental Death Penalty
Claims, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 589, 591 (1996).
46 H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 5 (1991), as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 88.
47 CORMAN, supra note 44.
48 See Chawes, supra note 26, at 196. While the TVPA has an enumerated ten-year
statute, the time period of the ATCA statute of limitations is uncertain. Many courts
have applied a 10-year statute of limitations, but not all. Chawes argues Congress should
amend the ATCA to provide an express 10-year statute of limitations. Id.
2006]
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circumstances that are both beyond his control and unavoidable
even with diligence,"4 9 the plaintiff bears the burden of showing
that the circumstances are so extraordinary as to warrant equitable
tolling.5° Some examples of circumstances where equitable tolling
is appropriate include: a claimant receiving inadequate notice, a
pending motion for appointment of counsel, or the court leading
the plaintiff to believe he has done all that is required.5 The most
common circumstance occurs when the defendant's misconduct
was a contributing factor in the plaintiff's failure to meet a filing
deadline.52 Equitable tolling is to be used sparingly; without
affirmative misconduct on the part of the defendant, the courts are
far less likely to excuse late filings.53 One decision from the
Northern District of California suggests that equitable tolling
should be available only when the defendant's wrongful conduct
prevents the plaintiff from asserting a claim or when
circumstances outside the plaintiff's control make timely assertion
of the claim impossible.54
Statutory intent can shed light on the appropriateness of
equitable tolling of a particular statute under certain fact patterns.
The ATCA and TVPA provide some international human rights
protections, without which many causes of action for serious
human rights abuses would not be heard.56 The Senate Report for
the TVPA proclaims:
[t]he legislation provides for a 10-year statute of limitations, but
explicitly calls for consideration of all equitable tolling
principles in calculating the period with a view toward giving
justice to plaintiffs rights. Illustrative, but not exhaustive, of
the types of tolling principles which may be applicable include
the following. The statute of limitations should be tolled during
the time the defendant was absent from the United States or
from any jurisdiction in which the same or similar action arising
49 Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269, 1271 (1 1th Cir. 1999).
50 Justice v. United States, 6 F.3d 1474, 1479 (11 th Cir. 1993).
51 Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984).
52 See Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990).
53 Id.
54 Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F.Supp. 1531, 1549 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
55 See Arce II, 434 F.3d at 1261.
56 Id.
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from the same facts may be maintained by the plaintiff, provided
that the remedy in that jurisdiction is adequate and available.
Excluded also from calculation of the statute of limitations
would be the period when a defendant has immunity from suit.
The statute of limitations should also be tolled for the period of
time in which the plaintiff is imprisoned or otherwise
incapacitated. It should also be tolled where the defendant has
concealed his of her whereabouts or the plaintiff has been unable
to discover the identity of the offender.57
It is evident from this passage that Congress intended to toll the
statute of limitations for the TVPA when the defendants are
outside the reach of either United States courts or other legal
systems where claims of human rights violations could be fairly
litigated.58
III. Introducing Arce v. Garcia
A. Facts of the Case
The three plaintiffs in Arce v. Garcia all have claims resulting
from acts of torture occurring at the hands of the Salvadoran
junta.59 Prior to their torture, all three of the plaintiffs were
working to improve the lives of others in El Salvador.
Juan Romagoza Arce was a physician in El Salvador.60  He
was never involved in politics, but organized health campaigns in
northern El Salvador where there was a great need for medical
attention by the peasants. 6' Although he carried no gun and was
only trying to provide medical care, Arce was kidnapped on
December 12, the feast day of the Virgin of Guadalupe.62 While
captive, he was shot, hung from sharp ropes, electrically shocked,
and beaten from 1980 until January 5, 1981.63 He arrived in the
57 S. REP. No. 102-249, at 10-11 (1991).
58 See Arce II, 434 F.3d at 1262.
59 Arce 1, 430 F.3d 1340, 1342 (11 th Cir. 2005).
60 Joshua E.S. Phillips, The Case Against the Generals, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 2003
(Magazine) at W6, available at http://www.cja.org/forSurvivors/washpost.doc.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Arce I, 400 F.3d at 1343; Arce II, 434 F.3d at 1257.
2006]
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United States in 1983.'
Neris Gonzalez was a Catholic Church lay worker in El
Salvador who arrived in the United States in 1997.65 In El
Salvador, Gonzalez worked as a health educator in a small village
where there were no doctors and pressed government officials for
health care and education reforms.66 She taught people how to
read and count, and for this Gonzalez was abducted by the
Salvadoran junta on December 26, 1979.67 For approximately two
weeks she was burned, stuck with needles, asphyxiated, repeatedly
raped, electrically shocked, beaten, forced to drink blood from an
open wound, and forced to have a bed frame balanced on her
stomach while pregnant.68
Carlos Mauricio was a college professor at the University of El
Salvador where he taught agricultural science.69 On June 13,
1983, individuals dressed in civilian clothing entered his
classroom and asked him to move his car.7° When he left the
classroom he was forced into an unmarked car.7 Mauricio was
interrogated and beaten for approximately ten days before he came
to America later in 1983.72
The two defendants in Arce were Jose Garcia and Carlos
Vides-Casanova. Garcia was the minister of defense in El
Salvador from 1979 to 1983. Vides-Casanova was the Director
General of the El Salvadoran National Guard. He later replaced
64 Arce II, 434 F.3d at 1256.
65 Id.
66 Julia Lieblich, "My Dreams Will Never Be The Same"; Neris Gonzalez Was
Arrested and Savagely Tortured for the Crime of Teaching Her Salvadoran Neighbors
How to Count, CHI. TRIB., May 25, 2003 (Magazine) at 8, available at
http://www.cja.org/forSurvivors/ner.doc.
67 Arce II, 434 F.3d at 1256; see Lieblich, supra note 66, at 8.
68 Arce I, 400 F.3d at 1343.
69 The Center for Justice and Accountability, For Survivors, Carlos Mauricio's
Story, http://www.cja.org/forSurvivors/CarlosforSurvivors.shtm (last visited Dec. 27,
2006).
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Arce II, 434 F.3d at 1256. Neither the first nor second opinion specifies the
exact date or month Gonzalez arrived, but they both affirm it was sometime during 1983.
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Garcia as minister of defense and served until resigning in 1989."3
B. Procedural History
On May 11, 1999, Arce and Gonzalez filed an action against
Garcia and Casanova in the United States District Court in the
Central District of Florida.74 Plaintiffs sought compensatory and
punitive damages under the TVPA and used the ATCA to provide
the requisite jurisdictional basis for their claim.75 On December
22, 1999, Mauricio joined the claim as a plaintiff.76 The three
plaintiffs brought their claims in the district court on February 22,
2000.77
On April 27, 2001, defendants filed a motion to dismiss as a
result of the statute of limitations, which the district court rejected
by holding the plaintiffs' claim as equitably tolled until January
16, 1992, the date restoring independence of the judiciary in El
Salvador.78 Defendants responded to the denial of their motion by
arguing that the statute of limitations for the claim had already run
and thus the claim was barred. 79 Defendants stated that they had
been available for service of process since the last act of torture.8 °
The most recent act of torture claimed by the plaintiffs was over
ten years old, so the defendants argued that the ten year statute of
limitations had run.8' The court rejected the defendant's argument
against equitable tolling and awarded the three plaintiffs $54.6
million in compensatory and punitive damages.82
In its opinion, the district court emphasized the fear of
reprisals against plaintiffs' relatives by parties aligned with the
defendants and justified the delay in filing the claims on these
73 See id.
74 See id.
75 See id.
76 See id.
77 Arce 1, 430 F.3d at 1343.
78 Id.
79 Id. at1344.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 See id.
2006]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
grounds.8 3 The defendants filed a motion for judgment as a matter
of law and a motion for a new trial claiming that the plaintiffs'
claims were time-barred under the statute of limitations.8 4 The
district court denied both of these motions.
On February 28, 2005, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the district court's judgment.86  The court noted the
express ten year statute of limitations of the TVPA and implied a
ten year statute of limitations for the ATCA.17  Congress
affirmatively intended that equitable tolling would be available for
the ATCA and TVPA and in Arce I the court did take equitable
tolling into consideration. 8
Equitable tolling can only occur in "extraordinary
circumstances" that involve defendant misconduct. 9 The court
wrote that it was reviewing, de novo, the issue of equitable tolling
for statutes of limitation for claims that took place in El Salvador
until the Salvadoran civil war ended.90 The Court of Appeals
rejected plaintiffs' arguments that the following circumstances
would be sufficient to justify equitable tolling: the civil war and
power of the Salvadoran military as an "extraordinary
circumstance," the pattern of denial by defendants of personal
responsibility for human rights abuses in El Salvador, Gonzalez
not arriving in the United States until 1997, and tolling of the
statutes until all of the defendants obtain United States residency. 91
The court also stated in dictum that allowing plaintiffs to get
redress in the courts would set a "dangerous precedent" that would
cause courts to hear ancient claims in trials more about the
legitimacy of regimes than of the lawfulness of particular
83 See Arce II, 434 F.3d at 1265.
84 See Arce 1, 430 F.3d at 1344.
85 See id.
86 Arce 1, 400 F.3d at 1351.
87 Id. at 1345-46.
88 Id. at 1346 (quoting S. REP. No. 102-249, at 11 (1991)) (stating that times where
the plaintiff is imprisoned or otherwise incapacitated should be excluded from the statute
of limitations).
89 Arce I, 400 F.3d at 1346-47 (quoting Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269,
1271 (1 lth Cir. 1999)).
90 Id. at 1346-47.
91 Id. at 1348.
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incidents.92
C. The Most Recent Holding
On its own motion, entered on August 5, 2005, the Eleventh
Circuit vacated its February 28, 2005 opinion. 93 The substituted
opinion, filed on January 4, 2006, emphasized the district court's
finding that fear of reprisals against plaintiffs' relatives by people
affiliated with the defendants justified the delay of the plaintiffs in
bringing their claims and that this fear of reprisals motivated the
district court to equitably toll the statute of limitations.94 The
Eleventh Circuit used the standard of abuse of discretion to review
the district court's decision and stressed in the second opinion that
the district court's ruling should be overturned only "when it
misapplies the law in reaching its decision or bases its decision on
findings of fact that are clearly erroneous." 95
The Eleventh Circuit emphasized the importance of statutes of
limitation in Arce II. According to the Eleventh Circuit, statutes
of limitation are promulgated primarily for fairness to the
defendants because the right to be free from stale claims prevails
over the right to prosecute in cases where the plaintiff has "slept
on his rights. 96 Equitable tolling halts a statute of limitations in
situations the court considers unfair or when circumstances are
beyond the control of the plaintiff and unavoidable with
diligence;97 in the instant case fairness to the plaintiff would be
compromised if the statute were not tolled. In Arce II, the
Eleventh Circuit emphasized the legislative intent to allow for
statutory tolling upon the creation of the TVPA. 98 The court also
92 Id. at 1351.
93 Arce II, 434 F.3d at 1256.
94 Id. at 1265.
95 Id. at 1260 (citing Minsey v. Head, 206 F.3d. 1106, 1137 n. 69 (11 th Cir. 2000)).
96 Arce II, 434 F.3d at 1261 (quoting Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express
Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 324, 348-49 (1944)).
97 Arce II, 434 F.3d at 1261 (quoting Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269,
1271 (1 lth Cir. 1999)).
98 Id. at 1262 (citing S. REP. No. 102-249, at 10- 11, (1991)). A non-exhaustive list
of equitable tolling under the TVPA includes when the defendant was absent from the
United States or a similar jurisdiction, when the plaintiff is imprisoned or incapacitated,
or when the plaintiff is unavailable to discover the identify of the offender. Id.
20061
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cited case law to provide examples of instances where, without
equitable tolling, "fair administration of justice" would be
impossible. 99
Arce II also mentioned the Salvadoran civil war and further
noted that friends of victims who came forward to testify took a
serious risk.' 0 In light of this, the court found the district court's
finding of fact "heavily supported by the record," and with these
findings of fact concluded the tolling of the statute of limitations
was well within the district court's discretion.1 The legislative
intent of the statute is to toll the claims until the defendants are
clearly within reach of United States courts, making both Arce's
and Gonzalez's claims timely, as they were filed less than ten
years after Casanova's resignation.'0 2 Mauricio's claim was not
within this time frame, but the court stated the district court had
discretion to toll this claim until the end of the civil war in 19 9 2 .03
The Eleventh Circuit saw the plaintiffs' fear of reprisals from
those affiliated with the defendants as legitimate and as the kind of
extraordinary circumstance that should not cause the statute of
limitations to run against a likely meritorious claim of torture." If
the statute ran out, many of those who were tortured would never
come forward to have their story heard.'0 5
IV. How Arce v. Garcia Will Save Lives
A. Legal Analysis
The Eleventh Circuit issued its first opinion in Arce v. Garcia
on February 28, 2005. This opinion provided that the ATCA
should have the same statute of limitations as the TVPA because
of the many similarities between the two statutes. 10 6 It stated that
99 Id. (citing Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1155 (1 1th Cir. 2005);
Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 773 (9th Cir. 1996); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672
F. Supp. 1531, 1550 (N.D. Cal. 1987)).
100 Arce II, 434 F.3d at 1265.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 1264.
103 Id. at 1265.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 The purpose of both federal statutes is to protect human rights by using civil
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equitable tolling is only appropriate in "extraordinary
circumstances" that are without the fault and outside the control of
the plaintiff. °7 The plaintiff has the burden of showing that
equitable tolling is warranted because "equitable tolling is an
exception to the rule of the statute of limitations, not the rule
itself." 108
The vacated opinion rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that the
statute should be tolled.' 9 The court viewed the unrest in El
Salvador as irrelevant because most of the plaintiffs and both of
the defendants came to the United States in the 1980s." The
court also did not view the cases cited by the plaintiffs"' as
binding on the Eleventh Circuit. 112 It did not find the defendants'
denial of personal responsibility for the abuses sufficient to "rise
to the level of misconduct usually required for equitable tolling"
because there was no affirmative misconduct."1 3 The court did not
believe the defendants could have hindered the plaintiffs from
accessing evidence.1 4 It saw the unavailability of the Salvadoran
courts to hear these claims as irrelevant."5  The court did not
regard Hilao v. Estate of Marcos as standing "for the monolithic
proposition that the defendant's absence [from the jurisdiction of
the United States] is alone sufficient to require tolling." 116 The
Eleventh Circuit concluded by stating that:
After dismissing each of the plaintiffs' arguments for equitable
tolling, we conclude by noting the dangerous precedent that this
case could set if those arguments were accepted. From a United
suits. Arce I, 400 F.3d at 1346.
107 Id. at 1347.
108 Id.
109 ld. at 1351.
110 Id. at 1348.
111 These cases include Rosner v. United States, 231 F.Supp. 2d 1202 (S.D. Fla.
2002), Cabello Barrueto v. Fernandez Larios, 205 F.Supp. 2d 1325, 1331 (S.D. Fla.
2002), and Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 767 (9th Cir. 1996). There is further
discussion of some of the relevant case law in Part B of this section.
112 Arce 1, 400 F.3d at 1348.
113 Id. at 1349.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 1350.
116 Id. at 1351.
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States perspective, there are many countries that oppress their
citizens today, and many countries that have oppressed their
citizens in decades and centuries past. A lenient approach
toward equitable tolling would mean that United States courts
would hear claims dating back decades, if not centuries. In
enacting a statute of limitations for the TVPA, Congress surely
did not intend to permit such trial-by-excavation, at least not
absent extraordinary circumstances. Courts would wind up with
cases that are based not on witnesses with personal knowledge,
but instead on the generalized testimony of human-rights
workers, diplomats, and assorted experts. Much of the evidence
would pertain not to the particular incidents at issue, but to the
illegitimacy of an overall regime. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs'
failure in this case to qualify for equitable tolling is not a death
knell for future claimants. Instead, it is merely a recognition
that 'extraordinary circumstances' is reserved for extraordinary
facts, and not for a plaintiffs failure to timely assert her
rights.11
7
This strongly worded opinion considered tolling in this
circumstance as a mechanism that would lead the court to hear a
plethora of stale claims." 8
The Eleventh Circuit issued a motion sua sponte on August 5,
2005 to vacate the February 28, 2005 opinion. On January 4,
2006, the court issued a new opinion, which allowed for the
$54,600,000 judgment of the jury." 9  This opinion examined
whether the district court had abused its discretion in equitably
tolling the statute of limitations, emphasizing abuse of discretion
as the standard of review. 120
Arce II allowed for equitable tolling. It reviewed the wording
and intent of the statute to determine whether equitable tolling was
appropriate, considering the policy behind the statute. 121
Analogizing the TVPA and the ATCA, the court examined the
117 Id.
118 Arce 1, 400 F.3d at 1351.
119 Arce II,, 434 F.3d at 1256.
120 Id. at 1260.
121 "Absent a cause of action in the United States courts, some of the most egregious
cases of human rights violations might go unheard because regimes that commit the most
serious human rights abuses often possess the most woefully inadequate legal
mechanisms for redressing those abuses." Id. at 1261-62.
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legislative history of the TVPA, and in that history found that
Congress "clearly intends that courts toll the statute of limitations
so long as the defendants remain outside the reach of the United
States courts .... ,,2 The Eleventh Circuit also found that
equitable tolling could be required when parties resided in the
United States if a situation in their home state created
circumstances in which the fair administration of justice-even
through a trial in the United States courts-might be impossible.
23
The court noted that, so long as an oppressive regime remains in
power, these regimes have an incentive "to intimidate witnesses,
to suppress evidence, and to commit additional human rights
abuses against those who speak out against the regime."' 124 The
court cited Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios125 as an example of tolling
the statute of limitations until the end of the power of a military
dictatorship and Hilao as supporting the concept that a regime
change may be necessary before the running of ATCA claims. 2 6
The Arce II court viewed the situation in El Salvador as
sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. The court saw the
military junta during the civil war in El Salvador 27 as a regime
that would have "used its significant power to thwart any efforts to
redress human fights violations that it perpetrated."'2 8 Evidence of
violations would be suppressed during this time period and
witnesses would have been intimidated and possibly tortured.12 9
The plaintiffs' fear of harm to family members and friends
remaining in El Salvador was legitimate, as "the [human fights]
record of El Salvador swells with evidence regarding the brutality
and oppression that the Salvadoran military visited upon the
people of El Salvador" including reports of abductions, torture,
and murder. 3 ° No remedy was available in the courts of El
122 Id. at 1262.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Cabello v. Femandez-Larios, 402 F. 3d 1148, 1155 (11 th Cir. 2005).
126 Arce II, 434 F.3d. at 1262-63.
127 The court determined that the war ended in 1992, less than ten years before the
filing of the claims by the three plaintiffs. See id. at 1263 n.22.
128 Id. at 1263.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 1263-64.
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Salvador duringthis time, as they had "a judiciary too meek to
stand against the regime."'
131
The two opinions used different reasoning to arrive at their
conclusions. Arce II looked to the legislative history of the
TVPA. 132  It also focused on the legitimacy of reprisals by the
military against the plaintiffs and their family and friends, noting
that these reprisals could have occurred even when the plaintiffs
resided in the United States. 33 Arce I expressed the concern that
equitable tolling allowed stale claims based on generalized
secondhand testimony.'34 The second opinion had a very different
take on equitable tolling. It saw the remedial scheme of the TVPA
and ATCA as requiring the clock to stop "while the regime
responsible for heinous acts for which these statutes provide
redress remains in power, frightening those who may wish to
come forward from ever telling their stories." 1
35
B. Arce v. Garcia and Prior Case Law
When the 1 1th Circuit handed down the second Arce opinion
they did not set the dangerous precedent alluded to in their first
opinion. 136 Instead the Court of Appeals issued an opinion in line
with earlier precedent. This more lenient approach is also more in
line with legislative intent than the approach used in the first
131 Id. at 1264.
132 Arce II, 434 F.3d at 1264.
133 "The court found that the plaintiffs legitimately feared reprisals from the
Salvadoran military, despite the fact that the defendants resided in the United States.
The military regime, in which both Garcia and Casanova had held positions of great
influence, remained in power. State-sponsored acts of violence and oppression continued
to ravage El Salvador. The very regime against whom the plaintiffs leveled their
accusations remained intent on maintaining its power at any cost and acted with
impunity to do so. Mauricio could not reasonably have expected to achieve justice until
after the military regime fell from power in 1992; only then could the evidence have
come to light and Mauricio have made his claims without fear of reprisal against family
and friends in El Salvador." Id. at 1265.
134 See supra text accompanying note 117.
135 Id. at 1265.
136 See Arce I, 400 F.3d at 1351 (stating that a more lenient approach towards
equitable tolling, such as that used in the second opinion, would cause the US courts to
be flooded with ancient claims and cause "trial-by-excavation").
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opinion '37 and it continues the flexible tolling of the ATCA and
TVPA recognized in previous cases.13
For example, Forti v. Suarez-Mason dealt with Argentinean
citizens residing in the United States bringing claims against a
former Argentinean general for torture, murder, and prolonged
arbitrary detention during Argentina's "dirty war" of the late-
1970s. 139  The plaintiffs were effectively denied access to the
courts out of fear for their own safety. 4 ° Forti applied equitable
tolling to events that are beyond the plaintiff's control and tolled
the limitations period until the barriers put in place by these events
were removed. 4 ' In light of the victims' fear for their own safety,
the statute of limitations was appropriately tolled.142
Hilao v. Marcos litigated claims of torture, execution, and
disappearance by the military and paramilitary forces under
Ferdinand Marcos' fourteen-year rule of the Philippines. 43 The
large amount of intimidation and fear of reprisals for speaking out
during Marcos' presidency equitably tolled any and all claims for
acts of torture until Marcos' presidency ended.'" As these were
extraordinary circumstances outside the plaintiffs' control, they
resulted in the equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. Both
Arce opinions mention Hilao. Arce I factually distinguished Hilao
and decided not to use this Ninth Circuit approach. 45 Arce II cited
Hilao and emphasized how tolling the statute of limitations was
appropriate throughout the entirety of the Marcos regime. 46 The
137 See supra text accompanying note 57.
138 See, e.g., Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F.Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
139 Id. at 1536.
140 Id. at 1550.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Hilao v. Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 771 (9th Cir. 1996).
144 Id. at 773. One other factor in this tolling was Marcos' enacting a statute
granting him complete immunity from suit during his time in office. Id.
145 See Arce I, 400 F.3d at 1350, n.6 ("We do not follow the Ninth Circuit's lead
because there are several factual differences between Hilao and our case, and because
the Ninth Circuit's lenient approach toward equitable tolling softens the rigors of what
constitutes extraordinary circumstances.").
146 Arce II, 434 F.3d at 1265 ("tolling statute of limitations under the ATCA and
TVPA '[u]ntil the Marcos regime in the Philippines was overthrown"').
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emphasis was not on the power of a single president, but the
control of an unfavorable regime which is analogous to what
happened in El Salvador and litigated in Arce.
Doe v. Unocal was a class action brought by plaintiffs in
Burma for human rights violations perpetrated through a joint
venture gas pipeline project.'47 In Doe, the defendants used
violence and intimidation to relocate villages, enslave farmers, and
steal farmers' property. In addition to causing the death of the
plaintiff's family members, the defendant's actions led to rape,
assault, torture, forced labor, and the loss of homes and
property.'48 This case highlights two circumstances in which
federal law provides for equitable tolling to be available: "where
(1) defendant's wrongful conduct prevented plaintiff from
asserting the claim; or (2) extraordinary circumstances outside the
plaintiff's control made it impossible to timely assert the claim."'49
The Doe court, basing their opinion on this framework and the
Ninth Circuit's Hilao decision, tolled the statute of limitations for
the time the military forces remained in power. During that time
the plaintiffs were unable to receive judicial review because of
their fear of reprisal.'50
Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios concerned the execution of
thirteen political prisoners by gunfire and stabbing in Chile.'
The Cabello court considered the Congressional intent behind the
TVPA in order to determine the circumstances in which the statute
of limitations should be tolled. 5 2  The court determined that
Congress intended to allow for equitable tolling when the
defendant is absent from the jurisdiction or immune to lawsuits, or
when the plaintiff is imprisoned or incapacitated.'53 Equitable
tolling is then pared down to the distinction of allowing tolling
when the defendant's conduct prevents the plaintiff from asserting
the claim or when extraordinary circumstances outside the
147 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
148 Id.
149 Id. at 897.
150 Id.
151 157 F. Supp.2d 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
152 See id. at 1367-68.
153 Id. at 1368, (citing S.REP. No. 249-102, at 11 (1991)).
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plaintiff's control make timely assertion of the claim impossible.'54
In light of these circumstances, the statute of limitations was tolled
until General Pinochet's military regime was replaced.' 51 While
both the first and second Arce opinions mentioned this case, the
two opinions gave Cabello slightly different treatment. Arce I
emphasized the need for affirmative misconduct for equitable
tolling, such as deliberate concealment. 5 6 Arce II did not require
affirmative misconduct; rather, the court recognized abusive
government practices were a sufficient justification for statutory
tolling." 7 Further, the court felt the statute should be tolled until
there is a regime change. 5
8
While all of these cases have slightly different emphases, they
are all used in the first and second Arce opinions. All allow for
equitable tolling during a military regime, and the logic of the
second opinion follows the precedents set by these cases more
faithfully than does the first opinion.
C. Future Implications
Arce II correctly acknowledges that torture can affect not just
individuals, but whole communities and even entire countries.
According to the Centre for the Care of Survivors of Torture, the
effects of torture can be physical, psychological, and social. 59
While torture victims may bear direct physical effects, 6 ' family,
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 See Arce 1, 400 F.3d at 1349. "Courts usually require some affirmative
misconduct, such as deliberate concealment." Id.
157 See Arce II, 434 F.3d at 1262. "Absent regime change, those in power may wish
to protect their former leaders against charges of human rights abuses. The quest for
domestic and international legitimacy and power may provide regimes with the incentive
to intimidate witnesses, to suppress evidence, and to commit additional human rights
abuses against those who speak out against the regime. Such circumstances exemplify
'extraordinary circumstances' and may require equitable tolling so long as the
perpetrating regime remains in power." Id.
158 Id.
159 See Centre for the Care of Survivors of Torture, http://www.ccst.ie/about.html
(last visited Dec. 27, 2006).
160 These physical effects may include flashbacks or intrusive thoughts, severe
anxiety, insomnia, nightmares, depression, memory lapses, sexual dysfunction, and a
breakdown in social relations. Id.
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friends, and even the broader society can be indirectly affected.161
The aim of torture is not just to affect the individual tortured, but
"to control society through debility, dependency and dread."'
162
Arce II wisely states that even if tortured individuals are in a safe
haven, so long as the oppressive regime which administered the
torture is in power, justice cannot be achieved. 163 The fear created
by torture will linger until all individuals formerly living under an
oppressive regime are safe, and it will only be then that justice can
be sought through the judicial system. Because the effect of
torture is so strong, allowing individuals to have ten years after the
ending of an oppressive regime to pull their lives back together
and file claims will likely lead U.S. courts to hear more claims in
the future.
One result of Arce v. Garcia is that torture claims from acts
perpetrated during the United States' War on Terror may be able
to be heard indefinitely. The War on Terror is unlikely to end in
the near future, as President Bush stated that "no matter how long
it takes, no matter how difficult the task, we will fight the enemy,
and lift the shadow of fear, and lead free nations to victory.
' 64
Since the fight on terror has no end in sight, the ATCA may be
tolled indefinitely if the courts determine the hostilities sufficient
to prompt equitable tolling. Adding ten years to the end of the
War on Terror provides a potentially very long window for
hearing human rights claims. One ironic consequence of this is
that if human rights allegations at Guantdnamo Bay 65 prove to be
true, the holding of Arce v. Garcia may help to allow these claims
to be heard in United States courts.
The Arce II interpretation of the ATCA is in line with
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Arce II, 434 F.3d at 1262.
164 George W. Bush, Remarks on the War on Terror, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
384 (March 14, 2005) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005
/03/20050308-3.html.
165 Guantdnamo Bay- a Human Rights Scandal, Amnesty Int'l,
http://web.amnesty.org/pages/guantanamobay-index-eng (last visited Dec. 27, 2006)
"Many of these detainees allege they have been subjected to torture or other cruel,
inhuman [,] and degrading treatment. Three detainees have died at the camp, after
apparently committing suicide. Others have gone on prolonged hunger strikes, being
kept alive only through painful force feeding measures." Id.
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Congress' intent that the United States should play a role in
promoting greater global justice. The TVPA was enacted
to carry out obligations of the United States under the United
Nations Charter and other international agreements pertaining to
the protection of human rights by establishing a civil action for
recovery of damages from an individual who engages in torture
or extrajudicial killing.166
In Arce II, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the role of U.S. courts in
providing a forum for greater global justice. The ATCA and the
TVPA work together to allow for claims to be heard once it is
fruitful to bring them, and not before then, when justice in the
court may result in further injustice outside of it.
V. Conclusion
This Note highlights the procedural history and holding of
Arce v. Garcia, including the district court opinion and the first
and second Eleventh Circuit opinions. The ATCA and TVPA
work together to provide both a jurisdictional and a substantive
basis for claims of human rights violations in foreign countries.
Like any time-barred statute, the ATCA and TVPA may be subject
to equitable tolling. Earlier cases allowed for equitable tolling in
the analogous factual situations of military regimes controlling
foreign countries and the use of fear and intimidation to prevent
claims from being filed.
The United States government supported the El Salvador
military junta'67 and bestowed honors upon the Salvadoran
generals, the defendants in this lawsuit.'68 Arce v. Garcia makes
history as one of the few post-World War II verdicts where a
civilian jury held military commanders responsible for torture, and
is especially noteworthy because no officers or troops were court-
166 Tort Victims Protection Act, Pub.L. No. 102-256; 106 Stat. 73.
167 Taubman, supra note 8 ("Ronald Reagan . . . funneled $1 million a day to a
repressive and often brutal Salvadoran government whose thugs and death squads killed
thousands of people .... The United States spent more than $4 billion on economic and
military aid during El Salvador's civil war, in which more than 75,000 people were
killed, many of them civilians caught in the crossfire.").
168 David Gonzalez, Torture Victims in El Salvador Are Awarded $54 Million, N.Y.
TIMES, July 24, 2002, at Al. Mr. Klaus, the defense attorney, drew attention to the that
both generals had been honored by United States in the past. Id.
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martialed for abuses and broad amnesty was given to junta-related
acts of torture. 169 With the ATCA and TVPA, the United States
ironically has an opportunity to bring about greater global justice
by providing a forum and remedies for the very atrocities it funded
in foreign countries.
The holding of Arce v. Garcia provides an important tool for
human rights activists. While a foreign country is still in turmoil
victims do not have to concern themselves with judicial redress.
Under Arce, victims then have a full ten years, without any fear of
retribution against themselves or others, to commence judicial
action.
E. REBECCA BALLARD
169 Id. (comments attributed to Sandra Coliver of the San Francisco-based Center for
Justice and Accountability).
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